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This comment began as a referee’s report on the essay - finding myself so 
engaged with its arguments that I went beyond my remit in ‘quality control’ and 
wrote a report of such extent that the editors (possibly dismayed by its length) 
asked me to convert into a comment on the review. In this spirit of meta critique 
then, what follows is less of a detailed engagement with the way in which the 
author reads The History Manifesto and The Practical Past, and more of a 
comment on their view of how to face our present condition as historians. The 
essay, the books it critiques, and the debates they have generated, are evidence 
of a fertile moment in debating what History is, and what it should be. 
 
While the piece is in agreement with the works it reviews that history ‘ought to 
have an all-important public role in shaping our future’; the Author takes 
Guldi/Armitage and Hayden White to task for defending what could be termed a 
developmental, or genealogic view of history. To paraphrase, this would be the 
argument that ‘useful’ history is the history of ‘how we got here’. The fundamental 
criticism levied at the developmental view of history is that this view forged in the 
kind of historical thinking developed in the nineteenth century to accompany the 
process of nation-building, is unable to address the present condition of 
‘unprecedented change’ - a change expressed in global effects such as the 
  
Anthropocene or the ‘technological singularity’ There are many elements of this 
argument I would agree with, but it is largely on the solutions presented by the 
Author that I would like to focus my comments on. 
 
This solution is two-fold. Firstly, the author argues that we need to recast the 
subject of history. Secondly, that a more suitable history for our present time 
would have to focus on disruptions, rather than on continuities, which are the 
bedrock of the ‘developmentalist’ view of history. 
 
Recasting the historical subject would mean asking what is the human, and 
whether the human should be at the centre of the project of writing history, 
encompassing material and environmental agency and taking into account the 
interactions of these multiple foci of agency.  However that does not alter the 
stakes in a the discussion between a ‘developmental’ and a ‘disruptive’ view of 
history. Both could be, and probably should be, reflexive and expansive in their 
consideration of their subjects. But in the same measure, both views could cope 
with a fundamental redefinition of its subject and still retain the essence of their 
distinct take on the nature of human experience through time. 
 
 
The author’s second point is more central to the argument: that to address the 
challenge of unprecedented change we must refocus our historical sensibility 
from a learned inclination to detect continuities to instead depart from moments 
of disruption to consider human history. But how dramatic a departure from 
historical practice is this? Guldi and Armitage’s view of the long durée is a 
legitimate target of such a critique, but it seems to me that the author somewhat 
misses the point made by White in The Practical Past in a chapter on history’s 
use of the category of the ‘event’ 
 
“…history itself, with its division into past and present, parses human 
nature into earlier and later avatars whose differences are often thought to 
be more striking than any similarities between them, already contains 
more than enough evidence of radical discontinuity.”1 
 
In other words, for White, disruption and continuity have long been central to the 
historical way of thinking (cf. Marx, or even Khun), while the opposition between 
one and the other falters in the face of their essential connection.2 Is it possible to 
think about history from a developmental perspective without considering 
                                                
1 47-48 
2 In addition, as Spiegel notes in her essay on his work, rupture and discontinuity have long been 
central, if somewhat paradoxically rooted, in White’s thinking about history. Spiegel notes that in 
his earlier essays, White argued that his analysis of the tropes of the historical genre was meant 
to allow historians to embrace the essential discontinuity of the human condition, even while 
retaining a sense of ‘progress’ in historical understanding. Spiegel, Gabrielle M. "Above, about 
and beyond the writing of history: a retrospective view of Hayden White's Metahistory on the 40th 
anniversary of its publication." Rethinking History 17.4 (2013): 492-508: pp.497, 501. 
  
disruption, and to see history as disruption without considering continuity? Each 
concept needs the other as a sort of chemical paper to be revealed - any 
continuity can only be perceived against the background of moments disruption 
through which its thread runs, or by which it is bookended. Disruption is only 
disruptive to the extent that it is seen to affect continuities, making itself visible.3. 
 
The distinction seems to me to hinge on the idea of the ‘unprecedented’ that the 
author invokes earlier in the essay to characterise our present condition, and with 
which I find myself in disagreement. In my perspective, unprecedentedness 
(please forgive the clunky term) is a condition of history, not a characteristic that 
can be attributed to a singular point in time - without the unprecedented, there 
could be no human experience of time, there could be no history. Exploring the 
nature of the ‘event’ in history, White places its importance in the historical mode 
of thinking in the following terms:  
 
“It is possible that the specifically historical event is a happening that 
occurs in some present (or in the experience of a living group), the nature 
of which cannot be discerned and a name given to it because it manifests 
itself only as an “eruption” of a force or energy that disrupts the ongoing 
system and forces a change (the direction or trajectory of which is 
unknowable until it is launched or entered upon), the end, aim, or purpose 
of which can only be discerned, grasped, or responded to at a later time.”4 
 
That is to say, the ‘event’ cannot exist other than in a condition of 
unprecedentedness, but even then only becomes historical once it is 
incorporated into a teleological sequence. Disruption, then, is a constant of the 
way in which modern civilisation thinks about itself historically, but has not yet 
been, from the perspective of the human as a historical entity, total. Total 
disruption from the human standpoint lies only at the ultimate unprecedented: the 
extinction of the species, and we have not yet reached (but can at least imagine) 
such an ‘event horizon’. However, while the imagination of a future 
without humans is certainly a challenge to historical thinking, it is not a 
fundamental one. The horizon of human extinction will itself have a history that 
can be imagined, even if there are no humans. And it often is, in a genre we call 
science fiction. Furthermore,other species or a form of AI could, imaginably, write 
the history of the extinction of humanity from a different standpoint (I like the idea 
of an extra-terrestrial Gibbons, although we could criticise it a priori for 
developmentalism). The act of imagining that non-human future  could serve as a 
                                                
3 At the end of The Practical Past, White questions the possibility of a continuity in both substance 
and appearance (p.101), but recaptures it through the notion of “practice” (102). It is also in this 
sense that I understand the idea of continuity (and as a consequence of disruption) – as 
performative reiterations, echoes, re-enactions by actors conscious of a past. On this 
understanding of continuity and change see William H. Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory 
and Social Transformation (University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
4 White, p.62 
  
way of sustaining the construct that allows history writing - much as the 
imagination of post-apocalyptical eternal life could sustain an historical world-
view for medieval Christianity. 
 
As such, the programmatic side of the essay, while stimulating, is less than fully 
satisfying. Seeing disruption and continuity as equally essential and inseparable 
parts of the human historical experience may equip us slightly better to look at 
the present, but is that enough? 
 
It is in the matter of whether any shift in perspective is enough that I find the 
author actually shares something with the authors of the two books discussed. In 
different ways, both Guldi/Armitage and White describe a kind of ‘crisis’ of history 
resulting from the way in which historians write and communicate history. Guldi 
and Armitage argue that, driven by specialisation and the demands of the 
profession, historians have left the essential task of synthesising, interpreting and 
giving shape to public historical knowledge to non-academics, or to academics 
(i.e. economists) who do not understand its nature.5 For White, in the modern 
quest for scientific status  ‘theoretical’ (i.e. academic and professional) history, 
has lost its ethical dimension, divorcing it from the everyday ‘practical’ past that 
has a real bearing on actions here and now. Both The History Manifesto and The 
Practical Past therefore see history loosing its public role as a result of internal, 
professionalising tendencies - although expressed in different ways. The author 
of this essay concurs with the diagnosis of the symptoms (a loss of a crucial 
public role for professional history), but not of the underlying disease, here a 
mismatch between the way in which view the human trajectory and the 
unprecedented condition of the anthropocene: History’s explanatory model no 
longer makes sense. While these diagnoses are clearly different, what unites 
them (with the partial exclusion of White’s) is the idea that if only historians could 
make more or better sense of the past they would regain a strong ethical, political 
and civilisational voice and, crucially, an audience. 
 
Personally, I find the assumption of a hierarchy of historical competence, a 
corporate entitlement of the academic historical profession, deeply problematic. 
White, I would say, goes further than either Guldi/Armitage or the Author in 
problematising the place of the professional historian. Invoking Oakeshott, White  
argues that history and thinking historically, rather than being in crisis, are doing 
very well amongst a wider public who is itself producing its own sense of history, 
and using it to think about past, present and future (and act), but largely without 
the aid of the academic historian. Yet, ultimately, White also sees the historian, 
or at least the historian/novelist as the bridge between the ‘theoretical’ and the 
‘practical’ past.  
 
But has history really lost its wider public? If we mean by that that professional, 
academic historians have lost a wider public, I would agree, even with the caveat 
                                                
5 Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto, Cambridge University Press (2014): 11-12. 
  
that perhaps there was never a golden age at which a public sat gratefully at our 
feet as we dispensed wise words of knowledge. History as a commodity has 
probably never had a greater reach, nor have there ever been so many people 
who are not professional historians engaged in the production of historical 
knowledge – including amateur and community historians, family historians, TV 
and media researchers and producers, computer game writers, and so on and so 
on.6  
 
This is I would argue are exciting, rather than threatening changes - although not 
without their pitfalls. And if there is a way in which historians can help address 
the challenges of environmental and technological change it can do so by being 
more democratic, sharing not only their knowledge, but particularly their craft 
much more widely. If historical knowledge matters for the present and future, it 
matters to the extent that it promotes reflexive, open-ended and pluralistic modes 
of thought and exchange. If we want that historical knowledge to be produced in 
such ways, we have to reconsider how to position ourselves. I firmly believe that 
if we can proselytise not historical narratives (either of continuity or of disruption), 
but what Marc Bloch called ‘the historian’s craft’, we can help create a citizenry 
that takes a critical stance with regards to its own past, present and to its 
possible futures – both in its continuities and its disruptions. But it is also my 
opinion that we can only do so embracing the demotic production of history, and 
fighting the battles about what history is and should be on that ground. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 In the interests of full disclosure, and self-promotion, these ideas are at the heart of a volume I 
recently co-edited: Bertrand Taithe and Pedro Ramos Pinto (eds.) The Impact of History? Histories 
at the Beginning of the 21st Century, London Routledge (2015). 
